What do we want from a theory of justice? Amartya Sen argues that what we should not want is to follow the social contract approach revived by John Rawls, or transcendental institutionalism, in its preoccupation with perfectly just institutions. Sen makes an effective case against approaches, such as G.A. Cohen's, concerned with transcendent, fact-independent principles of justice, but not against Rawls's constructivist approach to justice when this is properly interpreted as making a weak transcendental argument. Situating Rawls's approach within the tradition of the liberalism of freedom provides a basis for interpreting his Kantian constructivism as a form of transcendental institutionalism, and for revealing the affinities between Rawls's idea of reflective equilibrium and Jürgen Habermas's method of rational reconstruction. Such a Kantian conception of justice, concerned with constituting relations of equal liberty between free and equal citizens, remains essential for orienting our pursuit of justice.
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begins from existing social practices. While I will focus on similarities between the method of reflective equilibrium in Rawls's constructivism and the weak transcendental arguments of Jürgen Habermas's method of rational reconstruction, Rawls's approach may also be compared to that of Hannah Arendt. 9 Rawls and Habermas share a focus on a conception of political judgment that Arendt derives from Kant's model of aesthetic judgment. 10 Both are concerned, that is, not only with political judgment as subsuming particulars under universal principles, but also with a method of justification that seeks to make explicit the ideal principles that are implicit in particular judgments.
My central claim will be that Sen's critique of a preoccupation with perfect justice is best interpreted as directed against transcendent theories of justice, particularly Cohen's theory, and that when Rawls's constructivism is properly interpreted as a form of transcendental institutionalism it is not vulnerable to this critique. I first contrast the ways in which Sen and showing first that transcendental institutionalism's concern with abstract theory is not a distraction from, but rather helps guide, practical judgment.
Sen's critique of transcendental institutionalism
Sen puts his argument against transcendental approaches to justice in the following terms: 'The search for transcendental justice can be an engaging intellectual exercise in itself, butirrespective of whether we think of transcendence in terms of the gradeless "right" or in the framework of the graded "best" -it does not tell us much about the comparative merits of different societal arrangements'. 31 No importance is placed here on the distinction between a transcendent theory of the highest good and a transcendental theory of categorical principles of right. While neither approach provides a standard for the kind of comparative judgments that Sen favours, the two should not be conflated. On Cohen's transcendent approach, the identification of fundamental fact-independent principles of justice is a prior theoretical problem to be addressed before the practical problem of how justice is to be promoted, and traded-off against other values, through rules of regulation. On a transcendental approach, by contrast, principles of justice respond to the practical problem of restructuring the social world in accordance with the idea of an equal right to freedom, taking the form of principles of right that can guide practical judgment.
Sen makes his case for how a transcendental standard is neither necessary nor sufficient for making comparative judgments of justice with the aid of a number of examples. Two of these 31 Sen, Rawls assumes that the injustice of slavery has subsequently become one of the fixed points of our considered judgments, epitomized by Lincoln's judgment that 'if slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong'. On Rawls's method of reflective equilibrium, philosophical abstraction progressively draws out the universalizing logic contained within our considered judgments of justice. Further applying a Socratic strategy for arguing against slavery, the claim that wage labor under capitalism turns workers into wage slaves is a subsequent example of considering the extent to which a considered judgment has wider implications. There is no thought here that we turn to philosophy in order to find out whether what we think is just really reflects pure justice.
Rather than aspiring to replace imperfect judgments with judgments that reflect transcendent perfect justice, a transcendental approach is concerned with perfecting our practical judgments in accordance with the ideals they presuppose. 46 To more fully explore the basis of this view, in the following sections I will first consider further the transcendental status of Rawls's principles and then how they provide a guiding framework.
Kantian constructivism as transcendental institutionalism
Sen's characterization of Rawls's approach as 'transcendental' derives its rhetorical power from A weak transcendental argument, in Habermas's sense, takes inspiration from Kant's argumentative strategy, but does not regard the 'practice' upon which it focuses as fixed. 48 Nor does it regard the necessary conditions of this practice as given a priori. Instead, it joins to the idea of a transcendental argument the hermeneutical idea of a circular and reinterpretative movement in which the parts of a practice are interpreted with reference to the whole, and in turn the whole is interpreted with reference to its parts. Rather than seeking to provide a justification that would have to be accepted by any sceptic, 49 21 choice theory, rejecting the suggestion that it leads on its own to a unique set of principles. But while Rawls did indeed for a time hope that the original position argument could be strictly deductive, it is not clear he ever thought it could bear the entire burden of justification. Rawls is best interpreted as always having argued, not that the principles of justice as fairness are superior to all possible alternatives, but that they are the best for us given our social and historical circumstances, and in particular are superior to the leading historical alternatives of utilitarianism and intuitionism. 56 They make a claim to form the basis of a 'perfectly just society' in the sense that they best respect the requirements of publicity and stability required for a society to be wellordered by a reasonable conception of justice that can be the focus of ongoing collective endorsement by free and equal citizens.
Rawls, then, can be seen as starting from our practices of social cooperation, which include judgments about justice. Our considered judgments of justice are those rendered under conditions in which we have greatest confidence that our sense of justice is not distorted. Kantian constructivism seeks to systematise our considered judgments of justice by proposing that they social contract, that is, the theory that all social relationships are to be understood as if they were contractual'. 57 Habermas, Rawls and Gauthier all invoke the idea of deep structure associated with Chomskyan linguistics, seeing the demand for philosophical reflection as deriving from the need to go beyond the surface structure of everyday judgments to consider their deep structure. 58 Rawls acknowledges that 'the hypothetical nature of the original position invites the question: why should we take an interest in it, moral or otherwise?' His answer is that 'the conditions embodied in the description of the situation are ones that we do in fact accept. Or if we do not, then we can be persuaded to do so by philosophical considerations of the sort occasionally introduced'. 59 From the point of view of a positivistic conception of analytic philosophy, like Cohen's, this claim will seem an illicit conflation of fact and value. But interpreting Rawls's approach as a weak transcendental argument, it can be seen as incorporating a hermeneutical dimension of mutual adjustment between practices and principles in which we have no choice but to move back and forth between normatively salient facts about the judgments we make in practice and theoretical principles that seek to systematise these judgments, in a manner that blurs the distinction between pre-theoretical judgment and revision of judgments in accordance with theory. In what sense, though, is Rawls's use of such a weak transcendental argument connected with his institutionalism? Rawls detaches Kant's conception of autonomy from its background in Kant's two-worlds metaphysics of transcendental idealism to apply it to the choice of a conception of justice for the basic structure of society. Whereas Kant understands the categorical imperative as applying to individual maxims, Rawls applies it to determining principles for ordering social institutions. In Rawls's interpretation of Kant in terms of the categorical imperative procedure, we 'compare alternative social worlds and estimate the overall consequences of willing one of these worlds rather than another'. 61 The significance of Hegel's development of the tradition of the liberalism of freedom for Rawls is his concern with how freedom is 'actually realized in the social world through political and social institutions'. 62 In discussing this idea, Rawls echoes a distinction that he draws in A Theory of Justice between two ways in which an institution may be thought of: either as 'an abstract object, that is, as a possible form of conduct expressed by a system of rules', or as 'the realization in the thought and conduct of certain persons at a certain time and place of the actions specified by these rules'. 63 Rawls understands institutions as just when they realize principles of justice in the second sense.
Transcendental institutionalism focusing on principles of justice that when realized in the basic structure of society constitute relations of equal liberty between citizens. Unless and until Rawls's institutionalism is discussed within the framework of his transcendental approach to justification, as opposed to assuming he follows Cohen's transcendent idea of justice, then the case that Sen brings against Rawls must at least be found 'not proven'.
Contrary to Sen's critique, transcendental principles are principles for our social world, not for a perfect world that exists only in ideal theory. Like Kant and Habermas, Rawls seeks to make explicit the ideal principles presupposed by existing practices so that we may better judge in practice how the structure of these practices needs to be reformed.
Constructivism, the basic structure, and 'unity by appropriate sequence'
In this final section I will briefly assess the implications of the preceding analysis for a number of Sen's criticisms of Rawls's approach that all relate to its focus on the basic structure. Justice as fairness is a 'political conception of justice for the special case of the basic structure of a modern democratic society'. 64 It is the product of a constructivist approach to justification that proceeds in accordance with the idea of 'unity by appropriate sequence' in which principles of justice are tailored to the character of particular social practices. But while the basic structure of a domestic society is a focal point, from here we can work forward to principles of intergenerational justice, outward to principles of international justice, and inward to principles of local justice, or principles for special social questions. concerned with providing a general theory that like utilitarianism can be used to address almost all practical problems, then his theory can be seen as providing a valuable framework for guiding our approach to special social questions, and international justice.
At the level of the domestic basic structure, Rawls's idea of primary social goods and of the constitutive value of material equality -limiting inequality within bounds consistent with the common good -follows from reflecting on what principles are presupposed in asking how a practice of social cooperation between free and equal citizens is to be structured. 67 Primary social goods are used in constructing principles for a reasonable practice of cooperation between free and equal citizens, and the role of social institutions is to constitute the structure of this practice.
Sen emphasizes that the capability perspective is 'concerned with only one part of a bigger Rawlsian structure, viz. the metric underlying the difference principle', and specifically its focus on the primary goods of income and wealth. 68 However, the role of the difference principle has to be understood in the context of Rawls's lexically prior principles of justice and the primary social goods with which they are concerned, providing for a structure of equal basic rights and liberties, and fair equality of opportunity with respect to opportunities and powers and prerogatives of offices. Given this focus, Rawls notes that a primary goods approach is concerned with persons' capabilities, but only in their capacity as free and equal citizens, and furthermore argues that 'by embedding primary goods into the specification of the principles of justice and ordering the basic structure of society accordingly, we may come as close as we can in practice to a just distribution of Sen's effective freedoms'. 69 On this view, the role of a political conception of justice is not to establish a model of good human functioning to be approximated in practice, but principles of right that can reform the practice of social cooperation in which persons pursue their conceptions of the good. There is little reason to think that Sen need depart from this understanding of the role of a political conception of justice. Indeed, the important conclusion of his work on the causes of famine is that it is crucial to focus on persons' institutional entitlements in order to ensure a just distribution of goods.
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While Rawls's political conception of justice for the basic structure can be redescribed in the language of capabilities, though, it is not clear that Sen's consequentialist approach can provide a justification for Rawls's principle of equal basic liberties. 71 The priority of this principle presupposes reasonably favourable conditions, so there is every reason to think that as a theory of international development, the capability approach can play an important role in bringing about such conditions. 72 But when such conditions are achieved, Rawls argues that a conception of justice faces additional justificatory demands. Sen misrepresents the idea of the priority of liberty when he describes it as simply a matter of the importance of personal freedom. 73 Rawls's idea of the priority of liberty concerns the priority of equal basic civil and 27 political liberties over material well-being. 74 In a constitutional and legal sense, 'liberty is a certain structure of institutions, a certain system of public rules defining rights and duties'. 75 Sen continues to argue that focusing initially on principles of social cooperation between free and equal citizens is inadequate since provision for special needs occurs 'only after the basic institutional structure has been set up through the Rawlsian "principles of justice" (which are not influenced by such "special needs")'. 76 However, this criticism depends upon an overly literal and non-Kantian interpretation of the idea of a social contract. 77 Rawls does not seek to provide a blueprint for establishing a new society, but a framework for guiding judgments about our existing ones. When it comes to special social questions, Norman Daniels has argued persuasively that the problem of just healthcare provision should be posed as a problem of extending Rawls's theory, and that the theory that results differs only terminologically from Sen's capability approach. 78 While I cannot address it here, there are grounds for thinking that the much-debated issue of disability justice can be addressed in a similar way.
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There remains, finally, the question of whether beginning with the justice of a domestic basic structure represents a parochial and inadequately cosmopolitan idea of impartiality. Sen 74 example, then-Senator Obama reflected that 'The answer to the slavery question was already embedded within our Constitution -a Constitution that had at is very core the ideal of equal citizenship under the law; a Constitution that promised its people liberty, and justice, and a union that could be and should be perfected over time'. The practical task society faced was to 'narrow that gap between the promise of our ideals and the reality of their time'. 86 The implication of Sen's Idea of Justice is that a preoccupation with perfect justice is preventing political theory from exerting a progressive impact on politics. An alternative diagnosis of our current political predicament is that we lack frameworks for orienting our concern with removing clear injustices in accordance with action-guiding ideal principles. If this is the case, then there is much that is still living in the tradition of transcendental institutionalism.
